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Genetic Screening and the Insurance Industry
ROBERT POKORSKI, M.D.
A great deal of the present concern regarding future use of genetic tests by
insurers stems from a lack of knowledge of the basic tenets of private, voluntary
insurance. For this reason, I would like to examine briefly some ofthe fundamental
principles of insurance before directly addressing issues associated with genetic
testing.
Insurance is intended to provide financial protection against unexpected or
untimely events. In particular, life and health insurance are not purchased in
anticipation of imminent death or illness-although it's understood that death is
inevitable and serious illness is fairly common. Rather, life insurance is obtained to
protect dependents or business associates from the financial disadvantages that can
occur in the event of unexpected death, and health insurance is meant to provide
protection inthe event ofa significant financial loss associated with an unanticipated
illness.
How does private insurance work? Basically, policyholders pay a relatively small,
affordable amount into a common "pool," and the benefits of that pool are
distributed to the unfortunate few who die (life insurance), become disabled
(disability insurance), or develop a serious illness (health insurance). In thisway, the
financial loss attendant on these events can be mitigated even though the events
themselves cannot be prevented.
Yet not all people are alike. The likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of
loss will vary. Some people will apply for large amounts of insurance and others for
small amounts. Some will be young and others elderly. Occupations and avocations
will modify the likelihood of unexpected death or illness, as will health-enhancing
activities such as exercise, proper diet, and not smoking. And some applicants will
alreadybe inpoor health or atknown significant riskordevelopingpoorhealth in the
future.
These different factors are evaluated by the insurance company through a process
known as "riskselection and classification." The more common term for this process
is "underwriting." By means of the process, the insurance company determines the
appropriate contribution to the riskpoolby an individual policyholder.
The fundamental goalofthe underwriting process is equity: policyholderswith the
same or similar expected risk of loss are charged the same. The higher the risk, the
higher the premium. The lower the risk, the lower the premium. Note the distinction
between equity and equality. With equity, premiums vary by risk; with equality,
everyone-young/old, healthy/ill, and with/without associated factors that signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of experiencing an early claim-would pay the same
price.
Duringthe underwriting process, riskclassifications are created that recognize the
many differences which exist among individuals in order to place applicants into
groups with comparable expectations of longevity and health. Although the risk
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presented by any single individual cannot be determined with absolute precision, if
people are assigned to groups with reasonable accuracy and the total number of
insured persons is large, then the estimate of the risk of the entire group of insured
people is likely to be accurate.
Traditionally, characteristics of importance for risk classification have included
factors such as age,gender, health history, physical condition, occupation, the use of
alcohol and tobacco, family history, and serum cholesterol. These factors serve to
identify individuals who have a greater or lesser likelihood of premature death or
illness in the future. Because of this process, costs are held down for the great
majority of insurance applicants since premiums more closely match the risks
assumed by the insurance company.
Adverseselection, also known asanti-selection, is a consideration that is of a great
importance to insurers. Adverse selection is a well-known phenomenon in which
people with a likelihood oflossgreater than that which they are charged for tend to
apply for or to continue insurance coverage to agreater extent than do other people.
It occurs when applicants withhold significant information from the insurer and/or
choose amounts and types of insurance that are most beneficial to themselves. For
example, someone with ahistory ofheart disease is more likely to apply for insurance
and/or to apply for a greater amount of insurance coverage than he would have
otherwise done because he knows that he is likely to experience a claim in the
foreseeable future. Ifhe fails tomention this important information on his insurance
application and the insurer does not otherwise become aware of it, the premium
charged by the insurer will be insufficient to cover the risk involved. This premium
deficit would be madeupbythe others in thepool who have paid their fair share.
Adverse selection also occurs if the insurer is not permitted to obtain or to use
information that is pertinent to the risk being considered. In the example cited
above, the premiums charged would be insufficient to cover the risk involved if the
insurer was not permitted to ask the proposed insured and his attending physician
about the nature andseverityofthe heart disease, or ifthis information could not be
used after it had been obtained.
What wouldhappen ifthe insurance companywas unaware of important unfavor-
able information thatwasknown to theapplicants? In these instances, serious errors
inriskclassificationwouldoccur. Certain individualswould receive their insurance at
unreasonably low cost. More claims would be filed than were expected, and, if a
significant number of these risk classification errors were made, the financial status
ofthe entire insurance pool would be adversely affected.
Nevertheless, couldn'tpremiumssimply be increased across the board in order to
cover the payment of these unanticipated benefits? Where permitted, an insurer
could increase premiums to reflect these revised claims expectations-but this
increasewouldencouragepotential insurance applicantswho are at lower risk either
tobuy from a different seller or to exit the insurance market altogether. Moreover,
with the exodus of the lower-risk insured who were subsidizing the individuals who
had knowledge of their unfavorable risk status-individuals who had adversely
selected against the insurance pool-a further escalation of premiums becomes
necessary. More potential applicants then decide not to apply for insurance.
Eventually, a point is reached in this upward spiral where the desired coverage
becomes unavailable on any reasonable premium basis or the insurer becomes
financially unsound. This "assessment spiral" phenomenon is not a theoretical
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possibility; it actually occurred in some companies during the 1880s and early 1900s
because ofpoor riskclassification practices.
Conceptually, genetic disorders can be divided into two broad groups: (1) diseases
with a genetic predisposition, and (2) genetic diseases.
Diseaseswith ageneticpredisposition (or ageneticcomponent) are those inwhich
the presence of a gene confers an increased tendency to develop a certain disorder.
The disorder may or may not develop, depending on avariety ofassociated personal
and environmental factors such as geographic location, diet, exposure to harmful
chemicals ortoxins, exercise, obesity, tobacco use, heavyalcohol ingestion, and soon.
A genetic predisposition is often a factor in the development of common impair-
ments such as cancer, coronary heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and
epilepsy. Together, these disorders are responsible for much ofthe morbidity and/or
mortality that is experienced by the insurance pool.
Geneticdiseases are disorders inwhich thegenetic component is sooverwhelming
that it is expressed in apredictable mannerwithout a requirement forenvironmental
interaction. For example, an individual who inherits the gene for Huntington's
disease, cystic fibrosis, or Duchenne muscular dystrophy will eventually develop the
disorder regardless of other socioeconomic factors or preventive health measures.
Individual genetic diseases are rare compared to diseases with a genetic predisposi-
tion, but collectively they are an important cause ofmorbidity and mortality.
Attending physicians will probably begin to use new diagnostic tests that can
identify genetic diseases and diseases with a genetic predisposition shortly after the
tests are developed. As mentioned above, insurers have no current interest in
ordering such tests themselves. Nonetheless, although they may prefer to avoid
ordering genetic tests, it could be extremely important that insurers have access to
prior test results. Why? Ifthis informationwere unavailable tothe insurer at the time
ofunderwriting, then applicants who alreadyknew, through tests performed bytheir
attending physicians, that they were likely to experience early death or illness could
buylarge amounts ofinsurance coverage at prices that failed to reflect this increased
risk. In the aggregate, this practice could involve disproportionatelylarge numbersof
applicants and/or highlysignificant amounts ofinsurance. The ensuringclaimswould
markedly exceed projected losses, and everyone within the insurance pool would
suffer.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that a manwho applies for an individual
life or non-cancelable disability insurance policy has had a genetic test performed in
the past by his attending physician. Further suppose that the results are unfavorable,
i.e., the test suggests a significant likelihood ofpremature death ordisability, and the
insurance company does not learn about this result. If no other unfavorable risk
factors are known in this case, the policy is issued on a standard class basis.
What has happened? Essentially, the principle of equity has been violated. This
applicant with an above-average claim risk has obtained insurance at standard rates.
This situation is analogous to that of an older person who misrepresents his true age
and obtains insurance at the rates of a much younger person. It is important to note
that he has not suddenly become a standard insurance risk because he was issued
standard insurance. Rather, he is a substandard risk who has nonetheless obtained
insurance at standard rates because ofa failure ofthe underwriting process.
Although the applicant would be pleased with this arrangement, the other
policyholderswould be most unhappywith this sequenceofevents. True, he seems at
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present in good health. Nevertheless, his unfavorable genetic test clearly identified a
significantly increased risk. In addition, since his insurance coverage cannot be
canceled once it has been purchased nor can the premium be increased relative to
other policies issued to individuals with similar coverage, it is likely that he will be
paid benefits from the pool that are disproportionate to the premiums he has paid.
Many people have come to expect that private life insurance and, to a greater
extent, private health insurance, is anentitlement, i.e., that all citizens have aright to
expect that affordable insurance protection will be made available to them regard-
less of age or health. This expectation is based, to a considerable degree, on
misconceptions regarding the nature of private and public insurance programs. A
brief discussion of these two different types of insurance will help to clarify their
relationships.
Participation in a private commercial insurance plan typically is voluntary. You
choose whether or not to belong and determine how much insurance protection you
would like to purchase. Since all of the funds used to pay further claims against the
insurance pool are derived either directly or indirectlyfrom premium payments, risk
classification is essential in order to ensure that the premium charged is proportion-
ate to the risk assumed. The potential for adverse selection is very real and an
important concern of the insurer. Moreover, private insurance companies are
businesses that are accountable to their policyholders and stockholders. They must
generate a profit for those who have invested in the company. If insufficient
premiums are collected, a private insurance company, like any other business in
which liabilities exceed assets, will cease to exist.
American society has used private means to fulfill certain general social welfare
needs such as payment for health care. Butprivate health insurance has neverbeen a
completely adequate or universal method of providing access to the health care
system, nor has it been a perfect mechanism for covering all diseases. The poor,
disabled, aged, or seriously ill cannot always be covered by private means. For this
reason, society has supplemented private insurance with publicly supported pro-
grams such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare.
Participation in a public insurance plan is typically not voluntary. You do not
choose whether or not to belong, nor do you determine how much insurance
protection youwill have. Rather, participation is mandatory, and benefit amounts or
entitlements are determined bythe lawestablishing the program.
Since everyone-good risks, poor risks, even those suffering from severe or
terminal illness-is automatically insured and there are no options regarding the
amount ofbenefits thatwill bepaid, adverse selection is not a concern. Premiums are
charged in the form of income and social security taxes, or so-called "insurance
premiums," butthey are not and need notbeproportionate to the risk assumed. Risk
selection is not required, and no profit motive exists.
Even given these fundamental differences between private commercial insurance
and public insurance, couldn't legislators or regulators simply mandate that private
insurers provide coverage-at rates appropriate for lower risks-to those individuals
who have learned from theirattendingphysicians or an insurer that agenetic test has
identified a higher likelihood ofpremature death or illness? Or, in an actionwith the
same consequences, couldn't insurers be prohibited from asking applicants and their
attending physicians for the results ofprior genetic tests or from ordering their own
tests?
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There seems little chance that this procedure would work in a private, voluntary
insurance industry. Such mandated subsidization of unfavorable risks by good risks
would be tantamount to an indirect governmental tax levied solely against insurance
policyholders and stockholders. The effect of such an action might not appear
significant at the outset, but its cumulative effectswould be dramatic.
Under such a scenario, many potential policyholders-primarily favorable risks
whowould be asked to subsidize the higher, underpriced risks, and peoplewith other
health impairments such as cancer and heart diseasewho pay apremium commensu-
rate with their increased risk-would realize that they are being overcharged or
treated unfairly and would choose not to buy insurance because coverage has now
become unaffordable for them.
Why? Wouldn't the premium increase be relatively small? Although such a plan
for mandated benefits would probably not result in significantly higher costs at first,
premiums would gradually and progressively rise as more and more favorable risks
decided not to purchase insurance. As the relatively large base of good (standard)
risks was progressively eroded, it would become increasingly difficult to subsidize the
poorer risk, and premiums would increase again. The situation would worsen even
more as some companies decide to stop writing this type of insurance coverage
altogether since a profit can no longer be expected.
Such a legislative or regulatory mandate would force insurers to provide coverage
for a large (because ofthe effects ofadverse selection) group ofpeople at aprice that
would be insufficient to cover the claims that would occur. These additional costs
would be passed directly to other policyholders, with a subsequent decrease in
insurance affordability and availability.
Insurers are strongly supportive of advances in genetic research that will one day
lead to earlier treatment and/or prevention of disease, but they have no particular
interest in nor enthusiasm for using genetic tests. Their current risk selection
practices have generallybeen accepted bythe medical community and the insurance-
buying public. They have no desire to initiate new screening tests rife with uncer-
tainty and controversy.
Nonetheless, at some point in the future, insurers may be forced to consider using
genetic tests if that use becomes standard practice within the medical community.
This action would be taken to enhance the risk selection process. Even more
important, however, it might be necessary in order to provide some protection
against the significant adverse selection thatwould otherwise be certain to occur.
At this time, insurers are no more able to answer the difficult questions concerning
further use of genetic testing than is any other facet of society. In fact, most of the
questions themselves are still unknown. We will continue to study the issues and to
follow a reasonable course of action until significant technologic advances are made
and the nature and use ofgenetic testingbecome more apparent.
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